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I. INTRODUCTION
During my time at the Innocence Project, there was nothing more heartbreaking than the cases where I believed that the client was innocent but could
not find the DNA evidence to support that claim.' Destruction of evidence is
the number one problem faced by Innocence Project attorneys. 2 For various
reasons, evidence in criminal cases can be lost, misplaced, or destroyed, and it is
up to the defendants and the defendants' attorneys to make sense of the missing

pieces.
The struggle to prove that a defendant is innocent is already a challenging task without legal standards that provide additional hurdles.3
Yet, the
United States Supreme Court, with its 1988 decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,4
made the struggle even more difficult for those bringing destruction of evidence
claims. In Youngblood, the Court created an extremely high standard, establishing that when the state destroys "potentially exculpatory" evidence before a
defendant is given access to it, that action does not constitute a due process violation unless the defendant can demonstrate that the state acted in "bad faith." 5
Unfortunately, what.was initially hailed as an almost "impossible" standard by
critics 6 has almost proven to be just that. According to this author's research,
there are 1,675 published cases that have cited Youngblood to date but only
seven reported cases where bad faith has been found.7

The Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law is a non-profit legal
clinic and criminal justice resource center that works to exonerate the wrongfully convicted
through post conviction DNA testing and develops and implements reforms to prevent wrongful
convictions. Since its inception, more than 180 people have been exonerated, including 14 sentenced to death. The author worked at the Innocence Project in the summer of 2004.
2
Telephone Interview with Colin Starger (Nov. 4, 2004).
3

See, e.g., Interview with Audrey Levitin, available at

httpJ/www.rexfoundation.orgblog/2006/09/innocence-project.html ('The search for evidence in
a case can take many years and often ends with the discovery that crucial evidence has been destroyed or has degraded after having been kept in unsuitable storage facilities.").
4
488 U.S. 51 (1988).
5
Id. at58.
6
See, e.g., Karen Carlson Paul, Destruction of Exculpatory Evidence: Bad Faith Standard
Erodes Due Process Rights, Arizona v. Youngblood, _

U.S.

_

109 S. Ct. 333 (1988), 21

ARtZ ST. L.J. 1181, 1195 (1989) ("Proving bad faith, as defined in Youngblood, is almost impossible.").
7
See Elizabeth Bawden, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow - Three Common Mistakes Courts
Make When Police Lose or Destroy Evidence with Apparent Exculpatory Value, 48 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 335, 350 n.76 (2000) (finding only three cases of bad faith as of 2000). According to the
author's research, there are 1,675 published cases that have cited Youngblood as of August 2006.
The seven successful cases presented herein do not purport to be an exact statistical number of
cases in which bad faith was found but rather are the results of the author's best research efforts.
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The seven successful cases are special because they stand out amongst
their peers as cases that have achieved an almost unattainable goal. However, a
comparison with numerous unsuccessful destruction of evidence cases reveals
that the successful cases are not particularly unique or anomalous. In fact, they
raise the possibility that other cases would have been successful had they been
before other courts. Because these successful cases are not peculiar or extreme,
they can provide hope for those bringing destruction of evidence claims that
even the most ordinary case can bring about a somewhat extraordinary outcome.
In addition, there are a number of lessons to be learned from case-specific observations and common threads running through the cases. Each one provides
some insight into how the cases were won and how future claims might also be
successful.
This Article is intended as an aid for attorneys bringing destruction of
evidence claims under the Youngblood bad faith standard. Attorneys researching Youngblood claims and seeking legal precedent will be faced with a distinct
lack of cases that have successfully argued bad faith destruction of evidence.
Moreover, attorneys will have difficulty unearthing those few cases that have
succeeded in arguing bad faith as they have been decided at very different times
by various courts. For the foregoing reasons, this Article collates the seven successful bad faith cases and highlights the reasons for their successes.
Although the Youngblood requirement of bad faith for destruction of
evidence claims has proven to be a harsh standard for defendants, there is much
to be gleaned from the seven successful cases that may prove helpful. This Article not only introduces the cases that have proven bad faith but also suggests
factors that may have made them successful. The author analyzed the material
for this Article by comparing and contrasting the seven successful cases with
each other and with unsuccessful cases and through interviews with the defense
attorneys who argued the successful cases. In this manner, this Article is intended as a primer for attorneys bringing Youngblood claims and most of all as a
source of encouragement and hope in the face of a difficult standard.
Part H1 of this Article provides a summary of Arizona v. Youngblood and
explains the methods that courts have employed to deal with the bad faith destruction of evidence standard. Part III introduces the seven cases that have
successfully resulted in findings of bad faith destruction and juxtaposes each
successful case with a factually similar case that was unsuccessful in proving
bad faith. Part IV highlights case specific reasons for the success of the seven
successful cases. Part V identifies common threads that run through each of the
seven cases.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 109, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 8

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109

H. THE INTERPRETATION OF YOUNGBLOOD
In Arizona v. Youngblood, a young boy was kidnapped at a carnival and
later raped.8 After the rape, the boy's clothing was collected but not properly
refrigerated. 9 The defendant argued that the destruction of evidence was a violation of his due process rights.10 However, the Court held that the evidence
was only "potentially exculpatory" because the most that could be said was that
the clothing would have been subjected to more testing that might have exculpated the defendant." Therefore, the Court held that there was no due process
violation unless the defendant could show "bad faith." The court found that the
defendant did not establish bad faith because the failure of the police to preserve
the samples could "at worst be described as negligent." 12
Even though the Youngblood majority created a sweeping new standard, 13 the majority failed to fully clarify what constitutes "bad faith."' 4 The
Court said only that bad faith can be found in "those cases in which the police
themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for
exonerating the defendant"'' 5 and that bad faith "must necessarily turn on the
police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was
lost or destroyed."'' 6 The Court provided examples demonstrating that intentional misconduct is bad faith but negligent behavior is not. 17 With only those
few words of wisdom, the Court left the new Youngblood standard to be interpreted by future courts.
The lack of guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Youngblood has
forced lower courts to define the complicated and unresolved relationship between Youngblood and its predecessor, Californiav. Trombetta.18 In Trombetta,
the defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated and moved to suppress evidence derived from breath-analysis tests that had been gathered and
then destroyed by the state. The Court declared that in order to prove a due
process clause violation, the "evidence must both possess an exculpatory value
that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature
8

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 52.

9

Id. at 53.

10

Id.

11

Id. at 58.

12

Id.at 51.

13

Id. at 51.
Id.

14
15
16

17

18

Id. at 56.
Id.
Id.at 57.
467 U.S. 479 (1984).
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that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means."' 9
Courts have devised three different methods to deal with destruction of
evidence claims and to explain the interaction of Youngblood with Trombetta.
Yet, the methods adopted by courts have been criticized for creating further
ambiguity and have led one writer to argue that courts frequently "botch their
application of Trombetta and Youngblood" and to describe current applications
of these standards as "blunders." 20 Compounding the situation further and perhaps reflecting the idea that the Youngblood and Trombetta relationship is still
too unclear is the fact that some state courts have decided not to adopt the bad
faith standard. 21 While Youngblood is precedent and creates a standard for federal circuits, it does not do so for state courts that interpret state constitutions
and guarantees of due process under state law. 22 For this reason, many state
courts do not use the bad faith standard. Instead, various balancing tests that are
more indicative of whether a due process violation has occurred have been applied.23
Federal and state courts that have adopted Youngblood have devised
three different approaches. The first approach makes Youngblood a third requirement for the Trombetta destruction of evidence test that was in place before Youngblood was decided. 24 To prove a due process violation under the
Youngblood/Trombetta test a defendant would have to show: (a) an "exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, ' 25 (b) that the
defendant would be "unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably
available means, 26 and (c) bad faith by the government.2 7 A second interpretation treats Youngblood and Trombetta as completely separate tests for two different types of evidence.28 Under this approach, when the government destroys
Id. at 489.
Bawden, supra note 7, at 338.
21
Currently, thirty-six states have followed Youngblood. See generally Daniel R. Dinger,
Should Lost Evidence Mean a Lost Chance to Prosecute?: State Rejections of the United States
Supreme Court Decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329 (2000).
22
Id. at 342-43.
23 See Brent G. Filbert, Failure of Police to Preserve Potentially Exculpatory Evidence as
19
20

Violating CriminalDefendant's Rights Under State Constitution,40 A.L.R.5TH 113, 127.
24
25
26
27

See, e.g., State v. Femia, 9 F.3d 990, 993-94 (1st Cir. 1993).
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984); Bawden, supra note 6, at 346.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489; see also Bawden, supra note 7, at 346.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56-58; see also Bawden, supra note 7, at 346.

See Bawden, supra note 7, at 347-48 (describing an approach that only requires bad faith for
evidence that is not material under Trombetta, writing, "A different response is that Samek is not
required to prove bad faith because the lost Tape had apparent exculpatory value. Bad faith is
only required when government agents fail to preserve evidence whose exculpatory value is indeterminate."); see, e.g., State v. Greenwold, 525 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Wis. 1994) ("A defendant's due
process rights are violated if the police: (1) failed to preserve the evidence that is apparently ex28
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"potentially useful evidence," Youngblood applies and bad faith is required for a
due process violation finding. 29 Trombetta is used separately in claims involving evidence with "apparent exculpatory value" before destruction and does not
require a showing of bad faith.3 ° A third interpretation is beginning to be used
by courts after the Supreme Court's most recent destruction of evidence ruling
in Illinois v. Fisher.3' This approach requires bad faith for all claims but not a
showing that the evidence was apparently exculpatory.32 Cases discussed
throughout this Article utilize one of these three methods, and reference will be
made when the method used impacted the overall success of the case.
No matter which interpretation courts use, though, the Youngblood bad
faith standard is a difficult test to pass. However, rising out of the numerous
cases: United States v.
interpretations and confusion are the seven successful
36
35
34
Cooper,33 United States v. Bohl, Stuart v. State, United States v. Elliott,
State v. McGrone,37 State v. Benson,38 and United States v. Yevakpor.39
I1. SEVEN CASES, NEITHER UNIQUE NOR ANOMALOUS

This Part of the Article demonstrates that the successful cases are not so
different from cases with similar facts or reasoning that were unsuccessful in
establishing bad faith. Each successful case is juxtaposed with a factually similar case that was unsuccessful in arguing bad faith. In this manner, the seven
successful cases can serve as a source of hope for defendants and demonstrate
that despite the trends in the developing Youngblood doctrine that present obstacles for defendants, these seven have been able to clear paths and find triumph
where their peers have not. The seven successful cases do not have extraordinary fact patterns and do not have obviously due process-violative destruction of
evidence, but instead are ordinary cases, the same brought every day by defendants that lose in their Youngblood attempts. The analysis in this Part demonculpatory; or (2) acted in bad faith by failing to preserve evidence which is potentially exculpatory.").
29
See Bawden, supra note 7, at 347-48 ("A different response is that Samek is not required to
prove bad faith because the lost Tape had apparent exculpatory value. Bad faith is only required
when government agents fail to preserve evidence whose exculpatory value is indeterminate.").
30 See id. at 346-47.
31
540 U.S. 544, 548-49 (2004).
32

Id.

983 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1993).
25 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1994).
35
907 P.2d 783 (Idaho 1995).
36
83 F. Supp. 2d 637 (E.D. Va. 1999); see also Robles v. State, 85 S.W.3d 211, 216-17 (Tex.
App. 1999).
37
798 So. 2d 519 (Miss. 2001).
38
788 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
39
419 F. Supp. 2d 242 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
33
34
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strates that despite the numerous unsuccessful cases, attorneys and defendants
bringing Youngblood claims will discover, those cases might have been successful if brought before other courts.
The successful cases are discussed separately and in the order they were
decided. Each discussion begins with an introductory paragraph that explains
why the case might appear to have been successful and unique or anomalous
and then introduces the name of a case (cases) that had a similar fact pattern but
was not successful. The introductory paragraph is followed by a more detailed
discussion of the facts and reasoning of the successful case and an equally indepth presentation of the facts and reasoning of the unsuccessful case(s).
A.

United States v. Cooper

United States. v. Cooper appears to be a unique case that was successful
in proving bad faith because the state was put on notice by the defendant's attorney that the evidence should be preserved and the state nevertheless destroyed it.4° When asked why he thought the defendant was successful in showing bad faith, Dwight Samuel, Cooper's attorney for the appeal before the Ninth
Circuit, said he believed that the request to preserve the evidence was key and
that there was strong evidence that the state ignored the request and thus acted
in bad faith.4 1 However, in a case similar to Cooper (in its focus on the notice
issue), a court found that notice is irrelevant. In Illinois v. Fisher, the United
States Supreme Court succinctly rejected the idea that bad faith is proven when
it is shown that the state destroyed evidence after it had been asked to save it. 42
In Cooper, defendants Cooper and Gammill owned and managed a lab
that was used for manufacturing dextran sulfate. 43 The Drug Enforcement
Agency ("DEA") determined that the lab was producing methamphetamine and
charged both Cooper and Gammill. 44 The DEA collected two large vats that
were supposedly being used to manufacture the illegal substance and removed
them from the lab.45 On December 8, Gammill called the DEA and said that he
needed the equipment back. 46 On December 12, Gammill's attorney contacted
the DEA and demanded that the vats be preserved and returned. 47 However, on
December 21, the DEA had them destroyed. 48 On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the state did not contest the bad faith allegation but instead argued that
40
41
42

43
44
45

983 F.2d 928, 929-30 (9th Cir. 1992).
Telephone Interview with Dwight Samuel (Mar. 25, 2005).
See generally Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544 (2004).
Cooper, 983 F.2d at 929-30.
Id.

46

Id.
Id. at 930.

47

Id.

48

Id.
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there was no due process violation because the defendants could have obtained
comparable evidence. 49 The court rejected this argument and found that there
was a due process violation and dismissed the indictment against Cooper and
Gammill.5 °
The fact that the state essentially gave up on the bad faith issue makes
Cooper a particularly interesting case. It seems that, like Mr. Samuel, the state
believed that bad faith was undeniable in this case. However, perhaps if the
state had known how courts have disagreed over the effect that giving notice
should have on the issue of bad faith, it would not have given up so quickly.
In Fisher, a later case, the United States Supreme Court considered a
similar issue but made the opposite finding of that made in Cooper. In Fisher,
the defendant, Fisher, was charged with possession of cocaine and then filed a
motion for discovery requesting access to all evidence the state intended to use
at trial. The state said the evidence would be turned over at a reasonable time. 51
Fisher failed to appear at trial and became a fugitive for more than a decade.
During the time that he was missing, the state destroyed the white powdery substance that was allegedly cocaine. 52 Yet, when Fisher was captured again the
state reinstated the cocaine possession charges and convicted him. 53 Fisher appealed arguing that his due process rights were violated. The Supreme Court
found that his due process rights were not violated because there was no evidence of bad faith. The Court found that the presence of the discovery request
had no bearing on the bad faith issue.m
Thus, Cooper and Fisherdemonstrate how similar factual situations can
bring about very different outcomes. The Supreme Court in Fisherfound that
the state's destruction of evidence in defiance of a defendant's request did not
amount to bad faith. 5 Yet in Cooper, an earlier case that was argued before the
Supreme Court ruling in Fishercame down, the state did not believe it even had
a chance in contesting the bad faith allegation after it destroyed evidence in defiance of the defendant's requests, thereby resulting in a finding of bad faith.56
Cooper then, a case that was successful in arguing bad faith, did not even have
to argue bad faith, whereas Fisher, an unsuccessful case, was deemed to be
making an argument that had no bearing on the issue.57 This case and the other
cases in this Part illustrate the diverse treatment Youngblood claims will receive,
despite similar factual situations.

50

Id. at 93 1.
Id. at 933.

51

Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 545 (2004).

52

Id. at 545-46.

53

Id. at 545.
Id. at 548.

49

54

56

Id.
United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 929-30 (9th Cir. 1992).

57

T,-

55
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United States v. Bohl

United States v. Bohl is a case that seems to have been successful for
two reasons. 5 8 The first reason is that the state was put on notice that the evidence should be saved. 59 The second reason is that the defendants requested
access to evidence before it was destroyed. 6° Thus, the state could have responded to the defendants' timely request and saved the evidence.
However, there are two cases that have similar factual situations but different outcomes. First, Fisheragain stands in stark contrast as a case that was
not successful despite the fact that the state was put on notice that the evidence
should be saved. Second, United States v. McClure is a case that can be contrasted with Bohl because the McClure court found that even if the evidence was
requested before the state destroyed it, there was no bad faith. 6,
In Bohl, the defendants contracted to build radio transmission towers for
the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"). 62 The FAA ultimately concluded
that defendants had used nonconforming steel in manufacturing the towers and
brought criminal charges against Bohl and Bell.63 The FAA took possession of
the questionable tower legs and tested them. 64 Bohl and Bell requested access to
the material numerous times between October 1988 and October 1990 but did
not receive a response from the FAA until October 1990 when it turned over an
eighteen-inch portion of one of the legs. 65 In November of 1990 the government
admitted that the actual towers could not be located. 66 The court found that the
towers were destroyed in bad faith for five reasons, the first of which involved
the notice issue. 67 The court
expressed its frustration with the state's avoidance
of the defendants' requests. 68 The court explained:
[i]n evaluating the good or bad faith of the government when it
disposed of this evidence, we note first that the government was
explicitly placed on notice that Bell and Bohl believed the tower
legs were potentially exculpatory. Bell and Bohl repeatedly

59

United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 906-08 (10th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 907-08.

60

Id.

61

United States v. McClure, No. 90-5001, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 20371, at *18 (4th Cir.

58

Nov. 21, 1990).
62
Bohl, 25 F.3d at 906-08.
63
Id.
64
65

Id. at 907.
Id. at 907-08.

67

Id. at 908.
Id. at 911.

68

Id.

6
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sent letters to, and met with, the FAA to request access to the
allegedly nonconforming towers. 69
Thus, the notice issue was clearly an influential component of the court's bad
faith determination, and it appears to be a reason why Bohl was successful.
However, the court in Fisher considered an issue similar to the one in
Bohl and made the opposite ruling. 70 As previously discussed, Fisher held that
notice provided by the defendant's filing of a discovery motion and the subsequent destruction by the state was not proof of bad faith. 71 Therefore, although
the court in Bohl found that the state's destruction in defiance of a defendant's
request is evidence of bad faith, the court in Fisherfound that it was not.72
Another reason Bohl appears to have been successful is that at the time
the defendants made their requests, the government had the ability to save the
evidence.73 When asked why he believed this case was successful in proving
bad faith, John Dowdell, Bohl's attorney, said he believed that one of the most
compelling factors was that if the government had responded sooner the defendants could have saved the evidence, tested it, and possibly proven their innocence.74 The Tenth Circuit highlighted this in its opinion.75 One reason the
court gave for finding bad faith is that "the record reveals that the government
still had possession or the ability to control the disposition of the tower legs at
the time it received76notice from Bell and Bohl about the tower legs' potential
exculpatory value.",

However, in McClure, the Fourth Circuit examined a case with a similar
situation but came to the opposite conclusion.7 7 In McClure, the defendant was
charged with conspiracy to rob a bank and was accused of scouting out the bank
on a particular day.78 An FBI agent investigating the allegations viewed a surveillance videotape of the day in question but found the picture blurry and unclear and left it at the bank.79 When McClure requested that the government
turn over the tape so that he could view it, the government implied that the tape
was in government files. 80 Meanwhile, the tape was actually in the bank's pos69

70

Id.
Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 545 (2004).

71

Id.

72

Id.

Bohl, 25 F.3d at 912.
Telephone Interview with John Dowdell (Apr. 27, 2005).
75 Id.
76
Bohl, 25 F.3d at 912.
77 United States v. McClure, No. 90-5001, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 20371, at *18 (4th Cir.
Nov. 21, 1990).
78 Id. at*1.
73
74

79

Id.

80

Id.
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session. 8' Eventually the defendant learned not only that the bank had
82 custody
of the evidence but also that it had erased or retaped over the footage.
Like Bohl and Bell, McClure argued that the government's delayed response suggested bad faith because had he been notified sooner he could have
saved the evidence and viewed it. 83 Unlike the Tenth Circuit, the court in
McClure found this argument unavailing. 84 The court held, "if the footage did
exist during the time motions were made and the government's response foreclosed McClure's opportunity to gain it from the bank, he shows no bad faith by
the government, but rather, at the most, negligence., 85 Thus, whereas the court
in McClure found that a belated answer from the state could at most only demonstrate negligence, the court in Bohl found the state's delayed response to be
indicative of bad faith.86
Although Bohl was factually similar in certain regards to Fisher and
McClure, Bohl merited an opposite outcome. These comparisons demonstrate
that defendants should not give up on two arguments: notice that evidence
should be saved, and more specifically, requesting access to evidence before it
is destroyed.
C.

Stuart v. State

Stuart v. State could be viewed as a case that was successful in proving
bad faith because the government disclosed the existence of evidence but turned
the evidence over to the defendant with gaping holes. 87 The Stuart court emphasized that the missing evidence could have been exculpatory.8 8 This fact
pattern is analogous to the facts in United States v. Femia,89 where the state disclosed evidence with missing portions and yet bad faith was not found.
In Stuart, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder by torture
and was sentenced to death. 9° After he was arrested and placed in custody, he
spoke several times with his attorney on the telephone about his case. 91 He revealed to his attorney the names of three women with whom he had previously
had relationships and told his attorney that the state would not be able to locate

81
82
83

84

Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *6-7.

85

Id.

86

Id.
State v. Stuart, 907 P.2d 783 (Idaho 1995).

87

8

Id.

89

9 F.3d 990 (1st Cir. 1993).
Stuart, 907 P.2d at 783.

90
91

Ili
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them. 92 The state did find the women, and they testified against the defendant at
trial. 93 On appeal, Stuart argued that the sheriff's department obtained the
names of the women who testified by recording his telephone conversation with
his attorney. 94 In response, the state turned over its phone logs with missing
portions. 95 In addition, the district court found that one of Stuart's phone conversations with his sister had been recorded but not disclosed.96 Although the
court found that the defendant's conversation with his sister was not material to
the case itself, the court found that the conversation would have shown that his
calls were being recorded and "would potentially have led to suppression of
evidence of Stuart's prior relationships that was introduced at trial." 97 Thus it
was "indirect[ly]" exculpatory. 98 The Stuart court held that the failure to disclose the potentially exculpatory conversation with the other phone records
amounted to bad faith.99
The court in Femia, however, considered an issue similar to the one in
Stuart and made the opposite ruling. 1° In Femia, the DEA was investigating a
claim that the defendant was a cocaine supplier.101 The DEA recorded twentyfour phone calls made by the defendant, but transcripts were only made for eight
of the twenty-four calls.1 °2 Shortly thereafter, a DEA agent destroyed all the
original tapes, an act that the district court found to be "gross negligence" and
not bad faith.1 03 The destruction of the originals, however, was not considered
by the court in Femia.104 Instead, the court examined whether the surrendering
of the transcripts with fourteen calls missing from the record constituted bad
faith.105 The court determined that the state did not act in bad faith because it
fulfilled its Brady obligation by disclosing the evidence it had, and because the
content of the missing portions was unknown. The court held:
We do not know, and never will know, the content of statements that may have been lost. Contrary to the district court's
decision, no due process violation has occurred. The govern92

Id. at 786.

93

Id.

94

Id. at 785-86.
Id. at 789.
Id.

95
96

97

Id. at 793.

98

Id.

99

Id.
too United States v. Femia, 9 F.3d 990 (1st Cir. 1993).
101 Id.
102

103

104
105

Id. at 990-92.
Id. at 992.
Id.
Id. at 992 n.3.
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ment has disclosed the transcript evidence allegedly possessing
exculpatory value, as required by Brady and its progeny. The
lost audio portion and statements not transcribed are only potentially exculpatory, and the failure to retain that evidence does
not violate Femia's due process rights because the government
did not destroy the evidence in bad faith. 106
Thus, the holding in Femia is inconsistent with the holding in Stuart. Although
Femia found that the nondisclosure of missing, potentially exculpatory evidence
is not in itself proof of bad faith, the court in Stuart found that the nondisclosure
of some evidence that could have had an exculpatory effect rises to the level of
bad faith.
D.

United States v. Elliott

United States v. Elliott appears to have been unique and successful in
proving bad faith for two reasons. 10 7 The first reason is that the state's actions
were either reckless or grossly negligent. 10 8 The second reason is that the state
disregarded established government policy. 109 However, there are cases where
courts have considered similar situations and held that each of those do not
amount to bad faith. First, People v. Danielly 0 is a case where the court found
that mere reckless behavior is not sufficient to prove bad faith and that bad faith
requires ill will or sinister motive. Second, Lovitt v. Warden"' is a case where
disregard of established policy by a state agent does not amount to bad faith.
In Elliott, the defendant, Elliott, was charged with conspiracy to possess, distribute, and manufacture methamphetamine. 1 2 When Elliott committed3
a traffic infraction, he was stopped and his vehicle was searched by police. "
The police found materials they believed were used to make methamphetamine.
Some of those materials were tested for the presence of fingerprints. 114 After
testing, a DEA agent ordered their disposal. 115 The DEA agent used the fingerprint testing results when he testified before the grand jury and an indictment
followed. 11 Elliott contended that the destruction of the materials with finger106

Id. at 995.

107

United States v. Elliott, 83 F. Supp. 2d 637 (E.D. Va. 1999).

108

Id.

109

Id.

It0

112

653 N.E.2d 866 (I1. App. Ct. 1995).
585 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 2003).
Elliott, 83 F.Supp. 2d at 639.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 640-41.

115

Id. at 640.
Id. at 641.

"'l

116
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prints was a bad faith violation. 1 7 The court agreed and found that the agent
recklessly disregarded applicable government policy."18 The court held:
[W]here the law enforcement officer acted in a manner which
was either contrary to applicable policies and the common sense
assessments of evidence reasonably to be expected of law enforcement officers or was so unmindful of both as to constitute
the reckless disregard of both, there is a showing of objective
bad faith sufficient to establish the bad faith requirement of the
TrombettalYoungbloodtest. 119
Thus the court found that recklessness could amount to bad faith.
Yet in Danielly,12° a court considered a similar issue but made the opposite ruling. In Danielly, the defendant, Danielly, was charged with raping a
woman. 12 1 The woman claimed that while they were in his basement he forcibly
beat and raped her, but Danielly claimed that they consensually had intercourse
and that afterwards they had an altercation which lead to them physically hitting
and pushing each other. 22 Two days after the attack the woman went to the
police and asked for her belongings. 23 She was given everything, including her
allegedly torn undergarments. 24 Danielly claimed that the underwear should
have been held by the police because he could have used them at trial to show
that they were not torn, thereby proving that the intercourse had been consen26
sual. 2 He argued that the failure to save them was a Youngblood violation.
The court, however, did not find bad faith. The court found that "bad faith implies a furtive design, dishonesty, or ill will," and "[b]ecause there is no evidence that the police acted with a 'sinister motive' or with 'ill will' in returning
the victim's underwear to her, we reject defendant's arguments."' 127 Thus, the
bar set by the Danielly court with their definition of bad faith is much higher
than that set by the court in Elliott. Although the legal issue was the same for
the Danielly court, it analyzed the situation much differently. Where the court

119

Id.
Id.
Id. at 647-48.

120

People v. Danielly, 653 N.E.2d 866 (I11.
App. Ct. 1995).

121
122

Id.
Id.

123

Id.

124

Id. at 868.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 869.
Id. at 870.

117
118

127
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128 the
in Danielly required an actual purposeful and evil intent to
29 show bad faith,
excuse.
no
be
to
Elliott court found a claim of ignorance
In Lovitt, a court considered the issue of a state agent's disregard of policy but made a different ruling than the court in Elliott. In Lovitt, the defendant
was convicted of robbery and capital murder during the commission of a robbery. Lovitt filed a writ of habeas corpus and raised the issue of the wrongful
destruction of evidence in his case. 30 After his conviction, the chief deputy
clerk in charge of the case destroyed all the evidence from the defendant's
case.13 ' Although a law had just been passed twenty days earlier mandating the
preservation of all human biological evidence in felony cases, and even though
two other clerks warned the deputy clerk that he should not destroy the evidence, the deputy clerk had the evidence disposed of anyway.132 The court
found that "although [the code] became effective 20 days before entry of the
destruction order, the Chief Deputy Clerk was unaware of the statute's provisions when the evidence was destroyed."'' 33 Thus, where the Lovitt court excused a disregard of a statute because a state actor claimed he did not know
about it, the Elliott court found ignorance to be no excuse.

E.

State v. McGrone

State v. McGrone appears to be uniquely successful in proving bad faith
because the state did not appear in court to explain the destruction of evidence.,34 The police who were subpoenaed by the court failed to appear, and
the state took their reticence and absence to be evidence of bad faith. 135 However, in United States v. Solis, the United States District Court for Kansas considered a similar situation but decided that regardless of whether the state could
offer an innocent explanation, the burden36of proving bad faith was solely on the
defendant, and thus, found no bad faith. 1
In McGrone, the defendant was charged with motor vehicle theft and
two counts of aggravated assault on law enforcement officers. 137 While the defendant was driving a stolen vehicle, police set up a roadblock in an attempt to
stop him. After crashing the vehicle, the defendant attempted to flee on foot,
and officers again tried to stop him. At some point during the altercation the

132

Id.
United States v. Elliott, 83 F. Supp. 2d 637, 647-48 (E.D. Va. 1999).
Lovitt v. Warden, 585 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 2003).
Id. at 808.
Id. at 809-10.

133

Id. at 810.

128
129
130
131

134 State v. McGrone, 798 So. 2d 519 (Miss. 2001).
135
136
137

Id.
United States v. Solis, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Kan. 1999).
McGrone, 798 So. 2d at 521.
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defendant was shot once in the leg by an officer. 13 8 The officer claimed that as
he was reaching for his weapon, the defendant lunged at him and tried to grab
his arm. The defendant claimed that he was in the process of running away
from the officers and that the gun residue on his pants would prove that he was
fleeing. 139 After his capture, the police took possession of all of McGrone's
clothing and possessions." 40 The police lost McGrone's pants, and McGrone
alleged that there was bad faith destruction.1 4 1 Although McGrone had subpoenaed the police officers, the officers never appeared in court. 142 The McGrone
court found that the officers prevented the defendant from presenting his case
and held, "[w]here the State's actions absolutely prevent a defendant in a criminal case from presenting proof on
this issue, we will consider the requirement of
143
bad faith to have been proven."
The court in Solis, however, considered a similar issue but made the opposite finding. 144 In Solis, the defendants were charged with drug trafficking
and alleged cocaine and marijuana substances were collected by the government
and placed in a locker in the county sheriff's office. 145 The defendants alleged
that while the evidence was in the state's custody, Oblander, a deputy in the
sheriffs office, tampered with the evidence.
Oblander' s alleged tampering
with other evidence in the same room was an issue in another case. 147 Deputy
Oblander did not testify at trial about his behavior,148 and the court did not find
that there was a bad faith destruction of evidence. 49 Instead, the court found
that if Oblander, who allegedly had a substance abuse problem, did tamper with
the evidence, his actions would tend to show that he did not believe the evidence
was exculpatory (as is required by courts that use the Youngblood/Trombetta
test), and instead it would show that he knew it was inculpatory. 50 Furthermore, the court held, "[rlegardless whether [sic] the government can offer an
innocent explanation for evidence being destroyed or altered, the burden of
proof on bad faith remains on the defendants."1 '' Because the defendant only
138

Id.

139

Id. at 520-21.

140

Id. at 521.

141

Id.

142

Id. at 523.

143

Id.
United States v. Solis, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Kan. 1999).

144

146

Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1183-84.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id. at 1189.

150

Id. at 1188 (saying "instead, the alleged conduct of Deputy Oblander tends to show knowl-

145

edge that the evidence was inculpatory rather than exculpatory").
151

Id.
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attempted to call into question the state's behavior and lack of explanation, the
court found no bad faith or due process violation. 152 Thus, McGrone and Solis
are factually similar, but where the Solis court found that a lack of innocent explanation is irrelevant, the McGrone court found that it can be taken as evidence
of bad faith.'5 3
F.

State v. Benson

State v. Benson is a case that appears to have been successful because
the government was evasive about the existence of evidence.154 Benson can be
compared with two other cases, State v. McClure and United States v. Brimage,
in which the government acted and spoke inconsistently in regards to evidence
and appeared to be hiding something, and yet bad faith was not found.
In Benson, the defendant, Benson, was convicted for operating a vehicle
under the influence of alcohol. Benson filed a demand for discovery and later a
motion to disclose any videotape evidence. Benson was told that no videotape
evidence existed. 55 However, in March 2002, at a hearing on the motions, evidence came to light through the evasive testimony of the officer who had arrested Benson that a videotape had in fact existed. 156 First, the officer testified
that there was no videotape. 57 Then he testified that his car was equipped with
a camera, but that he was not sure if it was on when the defendant was arrested. 158 After more questioning, the officer said that the videotape was on but
that the field sobriety test probably was not recorded because of the location of
the camera, and he further explained that he did not look for the tape when he
was asked to do so by the prosecutor. 59 Later at trial, in June 2002, the officer
established that the tape had been destroyed earlier in the year. 16°
The court found that the officer had acted in bad faith. For the Benson
court, the officer's dishonesty with the prosecution about the existence of the
tape and later evasiveness in court amounted to "a dishonest purpose, moral
obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior
motive or ill will 161
partaking of the nature of fraud ...actual intent to mislead or
deceive another."'

152

Id. at 1188-89.

153

Id.; State v. McGrone, 798 So. 2d 519, 522-23 (Miss. 2001).

154 State v. Benson, 788 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
155 Id.
156

Id.

157

Id.

158

159
160
161

Id. at 697.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 696.
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Yet, for other courts, similar behavior has been regarded as far less severe and calculating. As previously discussed, in McClure, the defendant was
charged with conspiracy to rob a bank. 162 A government agent investigating the
allegations viewed a surveillance videotape of the alleged day, but left it at the
bank.' 163 When McClure requested that the government turn over the tape so that
he could view it, the government implied that the tape was in government
files. 64 Meanwhile, the tape was actually in the bank's possession. 165 Eventually the defendant learned not only that the bank had
66 custody of the evidence but
also that it had erased or retaped over the footage'
In Benson, the court found the government's confusing and contradictory responses regarding the existence of evidence to be proof of bad faith. 167 In
McClure, however, ambiguous and contradictory responses amounted to no
more than negligence, not bad faith.1 6 1 In McClure, on June 7, the defendant
submitted a motion to compel disclosure of the videotape and noted that government files did not contain the tape, which he believed to be Brady material. 169
In response, on June 13, the government made a statement that the court characterized as being of "questionable accuracy" as to the videotape's existence and
implied that the government was in possession of the videotapes. 170 Then, on
June 26, the government submitted a further response, admitting that it did not
in fact possess the tape. 171 The McClure court found that this behavior was not
indicative of bad faith. 172 The court held that, at the time of the government's
questionable responses, either the tape did or did not exist. 173 If it had already
been destroyed, then the government's misleading response made no difference.' 74 In a "there's no use crying over spilled milk" type of argument, the
court held that McClure would not have been able to use the destroyed evidence
at trial anyway. Also, even if the tape did exist, the court found that 75the most
McClure could show was negligence by the government, not bad faith.1

162

United States v. McClure, No. 90-5001, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 20371, at*l-2 (4th Cir.

Nov. 21, 1990).
163
Id.
164

Id.

165

Id. at *6-7.

166

Id.

167
168

State v. Benson, 788 N.E.2d 693, 696 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
McClure, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 20371, at *4-5.

169

Id.

170

Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *10-12.

171
172

173

Id. at *14-15.

174

Id. at *17-18.
Id.
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Benson can also be compared with Brimage, a case in which the defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm and ammunition.176 Government
177
officials monitored the defendant and other suspects during a sting operation.
The defendant argued that the police acted in bad faith in monitoring but not
recording conversations during the sting and that the conversations were potentially exculpatory. 78 Unlike the Benson court, the Brimage court found that
conflicting responses from the government were not in bad faith.' 79 In Brimage,
before the trial, the officer responsible for not recording the conversations testified that he did not record because he believed the recordings would be inadmissible in state court.18 At trial, he gave a different reason, stating, "I didn't think
I would have to rely on anything that was said in order to convict the both [sic]
suspects."' 8' Although the court acknowledged that the district court had referred to the responses as "lame" and that the responses
were "somewhat differ82
ent," the court found that there was no bad faith. 1
Thus, Benson appears to be a unique case that was successful in arguing
bad faith because the state was evasive about the existence of evidence. However, though Benson had an outcome different from those in McClure and
Brimage, the three cases are factually similar.
G.

United States v. Yevakpor

United States v. Yevakpor appears to have been successful because,
similar to Stuart, the government turned over incomplete evidence.1 83 Yet,
Yevakpor goes two steps further in that the government not only provided incomplete evidence during discovery, as was the case in Stuart, but also was going to present the evidence in its case at trial, and in that unlike the police in
Stuart, the agents in Yevakpor admitted that they selectively chose portions of
the evidence to save and portions to destroy. 184 However, the facts of Yevakpor
are not dissimilar to those in United States v. Mclninch, a case which resulted in
a finding of no bad faith where the government admitted to selectively saving
only certain portions of a piece 85of evidence and destroying the rest while intending to use the evidence at trial.1
176

United States v. Brimage, 115 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1997).

177

Id. at 75-76.

178

Id. at 74.
Id. at 77-78.

179

180 Id. at 77-78.
181

Id. at 78.

182

Id.

183 United States v. Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d 242, 244-45 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).

184

Id. at 24446.

185

United States v. Mclninch, No. 7:01-CR-00020, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14063 (W.D. Va.

Aug. 31, 2001).
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In Yevakpor, the defendant was indicted on two felony counts for attempted importation and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. 186 The government intended to introduce at trial three one-minute video
segments that were recorded at the government's facility as part of a routine
recording system. 187 The segments that were saved by the government allegedly
showed the defendant giving materials to a companion while the agents
searched his suitcase and showed the defendant attempting to use his cellular
phone. 88 At the direction of a supervisory agent, only about three minutes of
video were actually saved by the government, with about twenty-two minutes of
footage missing from the tapes. 189 The defendant made a motion in limine to
exclude the samples of video, and the court agreed with the defendant.190 The
court found that the preservation of only 12.5% of the videotapes at the direction of a supervisory agent gave the appearance of impropriety on the part of the
government. 191 The court found that there was sufficient evidence of bad
faith. 192 Although the court could not determine the exact amount of missing
footage or whether the missing segments would have proven exculpatory for the
defendant, the court did not believe that the government would destroy evidence
that was helpful to its case.' 93 The missing evidence was described as being "at
best, neutral and, at worst, adverse to the Government's case or of an exculpatory nature for the defendant.' 194 The court believed that the defendant should
have been
given a chance to review and decide the value of the evidence for
195
himself.
However, in Mclninch a court considered a similar issue but came to a
very different conclusion. 196 In Mclninch, the defendant was charged with three
counts of arson for allegedly setting fire to several welcome mats. 197 Investigators removed only a portion of each of the mats and left the remainder at the
scene.198 By the time the case came before the court, the remainder of the mats
were unavailable. 199 The defendant moved to suppress the mats, arguing that by
186

Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d. at 244-45.

187 Id. at 243-44.
188 Id. at 24546.

191

Id. at 245.
Id.
Id. at 247.

192

Id. at 247-48.

193

Id.
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Id. at 247.

189
190

195 Id.
196 United States v. Mclninch, No. 7:01-CR-00020, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14063 (W.D. Va.

Aug. 31, 2001).
197 Id. at *1.
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Id.
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Id.
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taking only a small sample of the mats and destroyingthe rest, the government
deprived him of evidence in violation of Youngblood.2 Contrary to the court in
Yevakpor, the court in Mclninch found that it had not been established that taking a portion of evidence but not the rest qualifies as destruction of evidence. 2 °1
The court held, "[i]t is not clear that the government's failure to preserve the
entire mat is the same thing as destroying evidence. ' 2 ° Interestingly then,
where the court in Yevakpor based the heart of its bad faith ruling on the fact
that the government chose to save only a small portion of evidence and took for
granted that taking only a sample of evidence to the exclusion of the rest is a
destruction of evidence claim, the Mclninch court was unsure of whether taking
a small sample even qualified for a Youngblood analysis.20 3
Yevakpor is unique and seems to have been successful in proving bad
faith because the police selectively chose to save only certain portions of evidence that it was going to present at trial. However, Yevakpor is not factually
dissimilar to Mclninch, where a court found that the preservation of only a portion of evidence may not even qualify for Youngblood relief.2°4
The seven successful cases appear to be unique and anomalous for various reasons. These cases have been able to successfully argue bad faith claims
where others have not. However, the seven successful cases are ordinary cases
and the type of claims that defendants bring every day. They are factually similar to other cases that were unsuccessful in proving bad faith. Yet, for certain
reasons, the defendants in these seven cases were able to argue successfully for
relief and thus overcome their ordinary natures to merit extraordinary outcomes.
To discover the reasons for the seven cases' success, several case-specific factors and themes running through all the cases must be examined.

IV. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THESE CASES
There are lessons to be learned from the successful cases. Case-specific
reasons for their successes can be found by looking deeply and may prove helpful in understanding how to win Youngblood claims. This Part consists of five
lessons that can be learned from case-specific observations: publicity can be
helpful in establishing bad faith, the size and type of evidence can help in establishing bad faith, incomplete or missing portions of evidence may affect bad
faith, putting the state on notice that evidence must be saved may be important,
and recklessness or extreme negligence may lead a court to make a finding of
bad faith.

2o
201
202

203
204

Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *5.

Id.
Id.
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Publicity

In February 1995, the Supreme Court of Idaho made a finding of bad
faith in Stuart.2 5 By that time the murder trial of Gene Francis Stuart had already been highly publicized. 206 The media frenzy surrounding the case had, up
until that point, seemed to be working against Stuart. Stuart had been accused
of murdering the two-year-old son of his girlfriend and was convicted of the
crime in 1981. 207 The child, Robert, was not yet toilet trained, and Stuart, who
was known to be a strict disciplinarian, often expected almost adult behavior
from the child. Stuart admitted to resorting to physical violence to punish
Robert.2 °8 On September 19, 1981, Robert was alone with Stuart at Stuart's
apartment. When Robert refused to eat his food, Stuart began poking the child
and even struck the boy in his chest. 2°9 A short while later, Stuart noticed that
Robert was breathing unusually and took him to the hospital. Robert died from
internal hemorrhaging caused by the rupture of the liver.210 Stuart was charged
with first degree murder by torture.21
The Lewiston Morning Tribune was a local newspaper that gave extensive coverage of the case.2 12 Articles from the Tribune included titles such as:
"Nurse tells of efforts to save boy," "Women testify that Stuart beat, choked
them," "Stuart admits striking boy with his fist," and "Prosecution wins dispute
in Stuart murder trial., 213 As a result, Stuart asked the court for a change of
venue outside the circulation area of the Lewiston Morning Tribune.214 However, instead of taking the case outside the area of that paper, the court moved it
to Moscow, Idaho.21 5 According to Bob Kinney, who was Stuart's attorney before the Supreme Court of Idaho, there were even more readers of the Lewiston
Tribune in Moscow than there were in Orofino, the original location of the
trial.216 It is not surprising that not only was he convicted at trial but that on his
first appeal for post-conviction relief the Supreme Court denied his claims. The
publicity could have only served to help convict Stuart at the trial level. Furthermore, it could have done nothing to help his cause at the post-conviction
level when he first made claims such as "there was insufficient evidence to war205

State v. Stuart, 715 P.2d 833 (Idaho 1985).

206
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Id. at 837.
Id. at 835-36.

2

Id.

209

213
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Id. at 835.
Id. at 837.
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rant a jury instruction and verdict based on first degree murder by torture., 2 ,7 If
any judge or juror had even caught a glimpse of one of the Tribune's articles,
doubt would immediately be cast on that argument. Nor would publicity help to
convince the court that "his sentence was unconstitutionally imposed . . . because of ...the failure to use a jury in the sentencing process. 21 8 Again, all the
publicity surrounding the trial could only serve to weaken this claim, especially
because the failure to use a jury was probably viewed as a wise move by the
court because of the potential difficulty in finding an impartial jury. Also, his
claim that "the sentence imposed in this case was disproportionate" would again
not be helped at all if any judge had even heard a whisper about the articles describing the last moments of Robert's life.21 9
However, in 1995, in his second appeal for post-conviction relief, Stuart
220
came before the court alleging a different kind of claim, a Youngblood claim.
This time Stuart argued that the state acted in bad faith in concealing evidence
that it had tape recorded a conversation between Stuart and his sister while he
was in custody. 221 Had that evidence been released, Stuart might have been able
to suppress the testimony of some key witnesses at his trial. For the first time,
instead of the media circus surrounding his case working against him, all of the
publicity may have worked in his favor. All of the hype in what Mr. Kinney
described as a "small town" could have made it more likely in the eyes of the
court that the police who lived and worked there had knowledge of what they
were doing in concealing the evidence.222
When interviewed, Mr. Kinney said that Stuart had been continually
"hammering at the door" of the Supreme Court of Idaho but did not win until
1995 on the Youngblood claim. 223 This situation highlights the fact that
Youngblood is a different type of claim, one that can require examining the intent of a state actor. For years, all the attention given to the gruesome details of
the case seemed to have been detrimental to Stuart. However, Stuart's attorney's focus on publicity and request for a change of venue may have actually
helped the defendant to ultimately win on an important claim.
Although the issue of publicity was not addressed in Yevakpor as it was
in Stuart, publicity may have had some bearing on the verdict. Kofi Yevakpor,
the defendant, is a well-known Canadian runner and former member of the Canadian Olympic Team.224 He competed for Canada in 2000 and also competed
217

Stuart, 715 P.2d at 838.

219

Id.
Id.

220

Stuart v. State, 907 P.2d 783 (Idaho 1995).

221

Id. at 786.
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Telephone Interview with Robert Kinney (Apr. 7, 2005).
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Id.

218

M4
CanadianRunner,http:/www.canadianrunner.com/content/view/8083/2/; http'/www.accessn
ews.com/modules/wfsection/article.php?articleid=8371 (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
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for Ghana in track and field at the 1992 Summer Olympics. An interview with
Mr. Gene Primino and a cursory inspection of newspaper archives both reveal
that there was also a good deal of attention focused on the amount of heroin that
Yevakpor was allegedly attempting to smuggle. 225 Mr. Yevakpor was found
with six pounds of heroin, valued at more than $600,000.226
B.

Characteristicsof the Evidence

Bohl is one of the most cited cases for the Youngblood bad faith issue,
yet it is a case that involves one of the most uniq ue types of evidence ever considered by a court doing a Youngblood analysis. 27 Yevakpor is a case that involves a type of evidence that is increasingly prevalent in today's society and
that is becoming easier to preserve due to technological advances. Both cases
demonstrate how characteristics of the destroyed evidence, such as the size of
the evidence, the ease with which the evidence could have been saved, and the
reliability and omnipresence of the evidence, may affect a court's Youngblood
analysis.
1.

Size of Evidence

Most destruction of evidence claims involve alleged controlled substances, clothing, or weapons. Bohl and Bell, however, were charged with using
nonconforming steel in manufacturing radio transmission towers for the FAA.228
The towers in question were four hundred feet, ninety feet, and forty-five feet
high. 229 These towers constitute physical evidence of a scale much larger than
that usually found in Youngblood cases.
When interviewed, James Lang, who served as Bell's attorney, said that
he believed part of the reason for the destruction was that the government did
not properly track the towers because they were so large. He believed that the
government did not know what to do with the massive structures. 230
However, the size of the evidence resembles the publicity issue in that it
also can either hurt or help the defendant. It is possible that the government in
Bohl did not know what to do with the evidence, and as a result, carelessly lost
it. That would certainly hurt Bohl and Bell. However, there is also the possibility that, because of the immense size of the structures, the court found it difficult
to believe that the government could not know where the evidence was at all
See, e.g., Six Pounds of Heroin Seized at Border, httpJ/www.wstmcom/Global/Story.asp?S
=4003006 (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); telephone interview with Gene Primomo (Aug. 14, 2006).
226
Six Pounds of Heroin Seized at Border, availableat http/www.wstm.com/Global/Story.asp
M

?S=4003006; telephone interview with Gene Primomo (Aug. 14, 2006).
227
Arizona v. Youngblood, 25 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1994).
2N

Id. at 908-09.
Id. at 907.

230

Telephone Interview with James Lang (Mar. 4, 2005).
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times. The smallest tower stood forty-five feet in height, and anything that large
would, to any reasonable judge, seem extremely difficult to lose.23' When asked
whether he believed that the size of the towers influenced the court's finding of
bad faith, John Dowdell, attorney for Bohl, replied, "absolutely," and emphasized how all three were very large, had three legs each, and came with many
different kinds of equipment. He also emphasized that the evidence here wasn't
just a drop of blood, but rather three massive towers.232
The foregoing is not meant to suggest that Bohl is not useful in cases
involving evidence that is more like a drop of blood than a massive tower. Instead, Bohl highlights that it might be worthwhile to focus on the unique features of missing evidence.
2.

Ease with which Evidence can be Saved

In Yevakpor, the defendant challenged the introduction of video surveillance tapes by the government.233 The agents had "cherry-picked" certain seg
ments of video footage to save to the exclusion of the rest of the footage.2
Amongst the court's many criticisms of the government's behavior was the argument that this type of evidence could have easily been saved. 235 The court
described the process of saving surveillance video as "a relatively easy and in236
expensive task considering that the video can be saved to compact disc."
Moreover, the court found that the actions of the agents in sifting though the
material and deciding which samples to remove was actually a more difficult
237
task requiring more time and effort than just saving it in its entirety. 23
Yevakpor demonstrates then, that in a world of alleged negligently or accidentally
spoiled DNA, semen, and clothing samples, destruction of surveillance videotapes and other types of evidence that can easily be saved can not be so easily
explained or tolerated.
3.

Reliability and Omnipresence of the Evidence in Today's Society

Another criticism by the court in Yevakpor involves the growing importance and reliability of video surveillance. In rejecting the state's argument that
the shorter preserved video segments were comparable to "snapshot photograph[s]," the court found that surveillance is conducted today with video rather
231

Id.

232

Telephone Interview with John Dowdell (Apr. 27, 2005).

233 United States v. Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d 242, 252 (2006).
234 Id.
235

Id.

236

Id. at 24647.

237

Id. at 247.
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than photography precisely because video is an important and reliable means of
surveillance because it offers an entire picture.238 The court held "the video recordings provide a more complete picture of events, a continuous stream of information, with less risk of scenes being taken out of context. ''239 The agents
eliminated the benefit and reliability of a full video recording by only preserving
certain segments. Furthermore, the court argued that with an increasing amount
of surveillance taking place in the United States, government agents are under
an even greater obligation to fully preserve surveillance evidence. 24° In today's
society, surveillance, or the threat of surveillance, seems omnipresent, both as a
growing source of security for the government and as a concern for a number of
private individuals. The court emphasized the prevalence of surveillance and
thus the importance for surveillance to be properly preserved. 2A1 For more
agents to act with the disregard of those in Yevkapor would pose a grave danger
to liberty. The court held:
Given the current state of affairs in our nation, when surveillance occurs both with and without our knowledge, a great danger to liberty would exist if Government could pick and choose
segments of recordings for use in prosecution, destroy the remainder, and then argue that the defense must show that the deor otherwise potentially
stroyed evidence contained exculpatory
242
useful and relevant information.
Thus, destruction of evidence that is collected precisely because of its reliability
may subject government agents to greater scrutiny by courts.
Numerous forms of evidence are collected in criminal cases by government agents. However, cases involving certain types of evidence and evidence
with certain characteristics may make a court more inclined to find that there
was bad faith destruction. A defendant should consider whether he can highlight the unique or important nature of the destroyed evidence, including
whether the evidence was large in size, whether the evidence could have been
easily saved by the government, and whether the evidence has a special status
because it is known to be reliable and prevalent in society.
Incomplete or Missing Portionsof Evidence

C.

Part H of this Article introduced two bad faith cases in which incomplete evidence was turned over by the state. Both of those cases, Stuart and
238 Id. at 246.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 252.
241

Id.

242

Id.
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Yevakpor, were then juxtaposed with similar but opposing cases where bad faith
was not found and were thus revealed as not particularly unique or anomalous. 243 Part II of this Article notwithstanding, something should be said for the
effect that incomplete evidence has on bad faith determinations. While incomplete or missing portions of evidence has failed to lead courts to make findings
of bad faith in a number of cases, in two out of the seven successful cases courts
have found missing portions of evidence to be indicative of bad faith. 244 Incomplete or missing evidence may alert a court that there has been a bad faith destruction.
At issue in Stuart were missing portions of telephone logs of Stuart's
conversations with various individuals. 245 The state turned over its phone logs
with missing entries. 246 The court found bad faith because although the state did
not attempt to hide the entire phone logs themselves, it did destroy at least one
entry and likely more individual entries and calls within the phone logs. 247 The
court held that "although the prosecution did not conceal the existence of the
phone logs, it did conceal the existence of the tape-recording of Stuart's phone
call to his sister which, if disclosed, would have inevitably
led to further discov248
ery regarding the sheriffs surreptitious tape-recording.,
Yevakpor involved the selective preservation by the government of approximately three minutes of video footage to the exclusion of approximately
twenty-two minutes of additional footage. 249 Again, the court found the fact that
the evidence was preserved, but not in its complete form, demonstrated bad
faith.25° The court had strong words for government agents who may in the
future attempt to pick certain portions of evidence to save and others to destroy.
Immediately following its Youngblood discussion, the court stated, "From this
point forward, let all parties - Government and Defense alike - be on notice: if
selected segments of a video or audio exhibit will be offered at trial, the entire
video or audio exhibit had best be preserved .... Simply put, the Government
cannot make use of video segments that have been 'cherry-picked' when the
remainder of the recording has been erased or recorded-over subsequent to defendant's arrest." 25
In an interview, Gene Primomo, defendant Yevakpor's attorney, said
that he believed that the success of the case turned on the fact that the govern-

243

Supra Part I.

244

The two cases are Stuart and Yevakpor.
Idaho v. Stuart, 715 P.2d 783, 786-87 (1995).

245

246

247

Id. at 787.
See id. at 791.

249

Id. at 793.
United States v. Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d 242, 252 (2006).

250

Id.

251

Id.
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ment preserved only a portion of the evidence. 5 2 Mr. Primomo noted that once
it was clear that there was a "hole" in the evidence and that the government was
responsible for the missing portions, the court decided that it was best to exin the case was that the
clude all of the evidence.25 3 He believed the major ' issue
254
government "had it all, but chose not to keep it all.
Incomplete or missing evidence may strengthen a defendant's
Youngblood claim. The fact that some portions of evidence were saved to the
exclusion of others, all within the discretion of state actors, may not sit well
with courts and may influence a court's issuance of a bad faith ruling.
D.

Putting the State on Notice that Evidence Must be Saved

Cooper and Bohl were cases in which the state was put on notice that
the defendants requested access to (and preservation of) specific evidence. In
Cooper, the government seized vats that were supposedly used for the manufacture of methamphetamine5 5 Mr. Samuel, Cooper's attorney, said that he believed that the letters requesting the evidence filed by defendant Gammill's attorney were important in demonstrating bad faith. 5 6 In Bohl, the state seized
three radio transmission towers, and the defendants' repeatedly asked for access
to them. 257 Mr. Dowdell, Bohl's attorney, also felt that the giving of258notice was
extremely important and influenced the court's Youngblood finding.
The Bohl court explicitly discussed the notice issue by saying, "In
evaluating the good or bad faith of the government when it disposed of this evidence, we note first that the government was explicitly placed on notice that
Bell and Bohl believed that the tower legs were potentially exculpatory."' 259 Mr.
Samuel discussed the importance of the notice issue and said that he believed
the letter to the state was extremely important evidence for the Cooper court and
that it angered the court about the situation so much that it made a finding of
bad faith.26 0 Based on these cases, if the state is placed on notice that evidence
is requested and the state not only ignores the request but also proceeds to destroy the materials, the defendant may have a good case for bad faith.
After being told about the Supreme Court's holding in Fisher,which effectively dictates that destruction of evidence in defiance of a discovery motion
does not amount to bad faith, both Mr. Samuel and Mr. Dowdell said that they
252

Telephone Interview with Gene Primomo (Aug. 14, 2006).

253 Id.
2

id.

255

258

United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1992).
Telephone Interview with Dwight Samuel (Mar. 25, 2005).
See United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 908 (10th Cir. 1994).
Telephone Interview with John Dowdell (Apr. 27, 2005).
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Bohl, 25 F.3d at 911.

260

Telephone Interview with John Dowdell (Apr. 27, 2005).
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believe the notice given in their cases was more than the pre-trial discovery motion in Fisher.26 1 In Cooper and Bohl there were direct communications made
by the defendants or their attorneys to the state.262 Mr. Dowdell believes that
even if Fisher had been decided before Bohl, bad faith still would have been
there was repeated notice given to the state, not just a discovery
found because
263
request.
Both attorneys believe that requesting access to evidence from the beginning and ensuring that it is not destroyed is a precaution of which all lawyers
must be aware. z64 However, there are attorneys who will be dealing with
Youngblood claims who have not had the privilege of working on the case from
the pre-trial phase. For those lawyers, the attorneys and these cases themselves
suggest that after destruction has occurred, emphasizing the fact that the state
was put on notice (if it was actually given notice) can make all the difference for
Youngblood claims.
E.

Recklessness or Extreme Negligence

Many courts that have conducted Youngblood inquiries have found that
reckless or grossly negligent behavior does not amount to bad faith. There are
so many cases that stand for this proposition that it could almost seem futile to
argue that the state acted recklessly or in a grossly negligent manner. However,
Elliott is a case where a court found that exactly that kind of behavior does
amount to bad faith.265
There are numerous examples of courts finding that reckless or grossly
negligent behavior does not demonstrate bad faith. For example, in United
States v. Jobson, even though the court strongly "disapprove[d] of the government's dilatory response to defendant's discovery requests" that resulted in destruction of evidence despite those requests and although the police actions were
negligent and "perhaps even grossly negligent," the court did not find bad
faith.26 In Montgomery v. Greer, a rape victim identified her attacker from an
array of loose photographs, but the police failed to record which photographs
they showed her and only retained the photograph of the defendant. 267 Although
the court described the behavior of law enforcement as "unprofessional" and
"slip-shod," it found that "mere negligence, without more, does not amount to a

261

Telephone Interview with Dwight Samuel (Mar. 25, 2005); Telephone Interview with John

Dowdell (Apr. 27, 2005).
Cooper, 983 F2d 928, 931 (9thCir. 1992); Bohl, 25 F.3d at 911.
262
263 Telephone Interview with Dwight Samuel (Mar. 25, 2005).
264
Id.; Telephone Interview with John Dowdell (Apr. 27, 2005).
265
United States v. Elliott, 83 F. Supp. 2d 637 (E.D. Va. 1999).
United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214 (6th Cir. 1996).
266
267
Montgomery v. Greer, 956 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1992).
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constitutional violation." 268 In United States v. Vera, the court found that although the government's destruction of methamphetamine samples was reckless
and grossly negligent, the destruction did not rise to the level of "connivance"
required for bad faith.269 Upon review of these cases and many others like them,
claims by government agencies that evidence was lost due to recklessness or
negligence would appear to give the government a free pass when defending
against bad faith allegations.
For this reason, Elliott is unique and a beacon of hope for defendants
arguing that a reckless or negligent destruction meets the bad faith standard.27 °
Unlike many others, the court in Elliott found that destruction resulting from
grossly negligent and/or reckless behavior by a state actor is bad faith.27' In
Elliott, after the police found evidence they believed to be methamphetamine in
the defendant's vehicle and tested it for fingerprints, a state agent destroyed the
evidence and in so doing failed to follow established procedure.272 The behavior
of the DEA agent is not dissimilar to the behavior of the officers in the three
cases discussed above. The court noted:
[T]he DEA Agent here authorized the destruction of valuable
evidence within hours of its seizure, based on his unsubstantiated assumption that the items were contaminated, and without
first conferring with a chemist and in contradiction to the rather
plainly worded regulations requiring
the preservation of evi273
dence for due process purposes.
Even though his actions could be considered merely grossly negligent and/or
reckless, his actions sufficiently outraged the court so that it made a finding of
bad faith.274
Thus, despite overwhelming evidence that courts refuse to find due
process violations when the state acts negligently or recklessly, Elliott can serve
to give hope to attorneys where there is evidence of negligence or recklessness
but no proof as to whether there was actual malice in the mind of the state actor.
At times, emphasis on the careless actions of the state just might work.
There are a number of case-specific reasons for the success of the seven
aforementioned cases. Although referred to as "case-specific," these factors are
not only pertinent to these individual cases but also may aid new defendants
bringing Youngblood claims. As explained in Part 1II, these successful cases are
268

Id.

269
271

United States v. Vera, 231 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001-02 (D. Or. 2001).
See Elliott, 83 F. Supp. 2d 637.
Id. at 640.
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more ordinary than may be realized at first glance, and defendants bringing
Youngblood claims should look to these case-specific lessons to possibly
strengthen their own arguments.
V. COMMON THREADS RUNNING THROUGH THESE CASES

In addition to the case-specific observations, there are also two common
themes that run through the successful cases. The courts that made bad faith
rulings focused on the materiality of the destroyed evidence and looked to the
state for an explanation of the destruction. An emphasis on these two themes
may aid defendants bringing destruction of evidence claims.
A.

The Courts Focus on the Materiality of the Evidence

Before Youngblood was decided, a number of courts had been using a
standard that weighed the materiality of the destroyed potentially exculpatory
evidence to determine whether a due process violation had occurred. However,
in Youngblood the Supreme Court created a new standard that only focused on
"bad faith" and made no mention of materiality. 275 As a result, both the concurring and dissenting justices in Youngblood expressed their disapproval of the
new bad faith standard.276 They believed the test was derived from an incorrect
analysis of past cases and that it was an inappropriate requirement. Both justices suggested that a better standard would be to look to the materiality of the
destroyed evidence. The courts of most of the successful bad faith cases echo
that sentiment by nonetheless discussing materiality in their bad faith inquiries.
The successful cases suggest that despite the Youngblood decision and the bad
faith standard, some courts still turn to materiality in destruction of evidence
claims.
In his Youngblood concurrence, Justice Stevens explained why examining the value of evidence is a more pertinent inquiry than bad faith. He said, "In
my opinion, there may well be cases in which the defendant is unable to prove
that the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of evidence
is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial fundamentally
unfair. ' 277 Similarly, in his dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed the same idea
and created what he believed to be a better standard. He said:

275

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 61 (1988).

276

Id. ("In my opinion, there may well be cases in which the defendant is unable to prove that

the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.") (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
id. at 66 ("In the same way, it makes no sense to ignore the fact that a defendant has been denied a
fair trial because the State allowed evidence that was material to the defense to deteriorate beyond
the point of usefulness.").
277
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Rather than allow a State's ineptitude to saddle a defendant with
an impossible burden, a court should focus on the type of evidence, the possibility it might prove exculpatory, and the existence of other evidence going to the same point of contention in
determining whether the failure to preserve the evidence in
question violated due process. 27 8 To put it succinctly, where no
comparable evidence is likely to be available to the defendant,
police must preserve physical evidence of a type that they reasonably should know has the potential, if tested, to reveal immutable characteristics of the criminal, and hence to exculpate a
defendant charged with the crime. 279
For both justices, the loss of unique and incomparable evidence is a violation of
the defendants' due process rights.
The judges in most of the seven successful cases also focused on the
materiality of the lost evidence. Four of the courts - Cooper, McGrone, Elliot,
and Benson - were obliged to discuss materiality because they used the combined Trombetta/Youngblood test for determining whether destruction of evidence was a due process violation. For courts that have adopted the hybrid standard, a defendant must show: (1) an "exculpatory value that was apparent before
the evidence was destroyed," (2) that the defendant would be "unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means," and (3) bad faith by
the government. 280 The second factor asks courts to weigh the materiality of the
evidence, and the third asks courts to make a separate bad faith finding. Thus,
these courts had no choice but to consider materiality. However, it is important
to note that the four courts gave more consideration to the materiality issue than
the other TrombettalYoungblood factors. Materiality was more than a requirement for the courts that used the Trombetta/Youngblood analysis; it was their
paramount concern. For example, in Cooper the court discussed at length why
there was no reasonably available evidence that would be comparable to the
destroyed lab equipment.28' The other two factors were barely discussed. 2
Furthermore, the materiality factor influenced and carried over to the court's
distinct examination of the bad faith factor. Also, in McGrone, the court made a
finding of bad faith purely based on the fact that the state deprived the defendant
of material evidence. The court explained that the police officers' failure to
appear at trial served to "negate the only means the defendant had for proving a
due process violation due to the destruction of evidence under Trombetta and
278

Id. at 69.

279

Id.

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984); Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56-58; see also
Bawden, supra note 7, at 346.
281 United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Youngblood," and that action was enough to amount to bad faith. 283 Thus,
McGrone demonstrates that a court's examination of the materiality factor in the
TrombettalYoungblood test can affect its examination of the bad faith factor.
Furthermore, even two courts that did not use the combined TrombettalYoungblood test and only used the Youngblood analysis (which requires
only a determination of whether there was "bad faith") could not resist emphasizing the materiality of the lost evidence. For example, in Bohl, although the
court only conducted a Youngblood bad faith analysis, it still made note of the
importance of the destroyed towers.2m The court said, "the evidence disposed
of here was central to the government's case" and "nothing was more probative
on the issue of the steel composition of [the] towers than the towers themselves., 285 Thus, the court still gave a great deal of weight to the fact that the
evidence was irreplaceable. Similarly, the court in Stuart only considered
whether there was bad faith destruction but nevertheless emphasized the materiality of the lost evidence.286 The court explained that if only the phone conversation between Stuart and his sister had been disclosed, Stuart could have gained
access to the entire phone record and possibly suppressed it. The court said,
"but for the nondisclosure of [Stuart's conversation with his sister], the phone
logs .
would undoubtedly have been preserved. ' ' 287 Thus, the court stressed
how central the phone conversation was to the outcome of the case. 288
The successful cases indicate that materiality can still be an influential
factor in bad faith determinations. Like the concurring and dissenting justices in
Youngblood, the courts that have made findings of bad faith could not resist
being drawn into discussions of the importance of the missing evidence. A defendant may do well to bring the materiality of the destroyed evidence to the
court's attention.
B.

The Courts Ask the State to Explain the Destructionof Evidence

The burden of proving bad faith is usually understood to rest solely with
the defendant. In Youngblood the Court held, "unless a criminal defendant can
show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." 289 The Court only
discussed the duty of the defendant and made no mention of whether a state
would be required to offer an innocent explanation for destruction in order to

283 State v. McGrone, 798 So. 2d 519, 523 (Miss. 2001).

United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 912 (10th Cir. 1994).
285 Id.
286
Idaho v. Stewart, 907 P.2d 783, 791 (1995).
287
Id.
288
Id.
284

289 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 61 (1988).
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demonstrate good faith or a lack of bad faith. 29 0 Thus, a reading of Youngblood
suggests that a court's "camera" is supposed to remain focused on the defendant. 29 1 However, in most of the successful cases the courts' cameras stray from
the defense and turn to the government. The cases reveal that some courts shift
their focus to the state and can be so angered or puzzled by what they see that
they make a finding of bad faith.
McGrone is one of the strongest examples of a court that makes a finding of bad faith after shifting the camera to the state. In McGrone, the court
focused almost exclusively on the government's lack of explanation for the destruction of the evidence. The court did not even weigh the defendant's evidence of bad faith. In fact, the court said that McGrone was unable to "presen[t]
proof on this issue" because his main argument could only be refuted by the
police officers who did not appear at trial.2 92 Thus, without discussing the merit
of McGrone's argument, the court looked at the293state's lack of argument or explanation and took that as evidence of bad faith.
The court in Bohl similarly shifted its camera to the state. 294 Although
the court in Bohl discussed the defendant's evidence of bad faith, it also discussed in depth the fact that the government did not offer an innocent explanation for its behavior.295 It took care to note that "the government offers no innocent explanation for its failure to preserve the steel which formed the core of its
criminal case against Bell and Bohl," and that "the government here offers no
reasonable rationale or good faith explanation for the destruction of the evidence. ' 296 In fact, the entire finding of bad faith could have been different had
the government just offered some justification. The court said that if the government had an excuse, it could counter the evidence of bad faith. 297 The court
said, "even if the government destroys or facilitates the disposition of evidence
knowing of its potentially exculpatory value, there might exist innocent explanations for the government's conduct that are reasonable under the circumstances
to negate any inference of bad faith., 298 Without that innocent explanation,
however, the court found that the state had engaged in a bad faith destruction of
the evidence.29
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Id. at 523-24.
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3
Elliott continues the theme of a court shifting its camera to the state. 00
In Elliott, the court held that the defendant's argument for bad faith was meritless and instead examined the state's evidence of good faith. 30 The defendant
in Elliott argued that the DEA agent in the case acted in "subjective bad faith"
because he sgoke to the defendant with crude language and acted in a threatening manner. However, the court found there was no merit to the defendant's
argument because the harsh words from the agent occurred almost three weeks
after the destruction of the evidence. 30 3 After rejecting the defendant's explanation of how the state acted in bad faith, the court turned to the state's explanation of how it acted in good faith. 304 The state argued that its agents were following DEA and Department of Justice policies. However, the court found that
the agents had actually acted contrary to established policy and therefore had
acted in bad faith. 30 5 The court's determination of bad3 faith
then rested solely
6
on the government's argument and not on the defense's. 0
Yevakpor is yet another example of a court that shifted its camera and
turned to the government for an explanation for missing evidence.3 ° In Yevakpor the court looked to the state for an explanation of the destruction of twentytwo minutes of surveillance video of the defendant. The court found the response to be unsatisfactory. The government argued that the destruction was in
accordance with agency routine and policy. 30 8 The court quickly rejected the
state's defense, finding that the government was on notice that discoverable
evidence must be preserved.3°
The decision contains no further justification by the government for its
destruction of twenty-two minutes of surveillance footage of the defendant and
preservation of only three minutes. 310 The lack of an in-depth discussion in the
record of the government's defense is probably due to the fact that during court
proceedings the government lacked a concrete explanation. Mr. Primomo reports that when the U.S. Attorney was asked by the court why the missing portions were removed, 311
he did not have an explanation and essentially had to
"shrug his shoulders.,

300 United States v. Elliott, 83 F. Supp. 2d 637 (E.D. Va. 1999).
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Perhaps the most straightforward demonstration of the government's
burden is in Benson.3 12 In Benson, the court said that under a Youngblood
analysis it must consider "whether the state acted in good faith."'3 13 Framing the
issue as whether the state acted in "good faith" rather than whether the state
acted in "bad faith" creates a subtle but important shift in the burden. A defense
of good faith destruction rests solely on the government, not the defendant, and
the government must provide an innocuous reason for the loss of evidence or
else fail the Youngblood analysis.
The successful cases indicate that in bad faith cases the pressure is not
always only on the defendant. Even defendants with meritless cases can sometimes demonstrate bad faith by turning the tables and pointing to inadequacies in
the government's case. As some attorneys suggested when interviewed about
these cases, angering the court about the state's lack of explanation (or the
state's poor excuse) may be sufficient to prove bad faith.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Youngblood bad faith destruction of evidence standard is a difficult
standard to satisfy, but not an impossible one. Out of over one thousand reported cases that have cited to Youngblood to date, there are seven where courts
have found bad faith destruction of evidence by the government. These seven
are not outliers or strange occurrences but instead are the types of claims that
attorneys deal with every day. Each can be contrasted with a similar case that
was unsuccessful in proving bad faith. These cases serve to give hope to defendants and attorneys bringing destruction of evidence claims and demonstrate
that even the most ordinary of cases can bring about an extraordinary outcome a finding of bad faith destruction of evidence, and thus a ruling that there has
been a due process rights violation.
There are a number of lessons to be learned from the successful cases,
based on both case-specific observations and common threads that run throughout the seven. The lesson to be learned from each case is that the level of publicity involved, the characteristics of evidence at issue, incomplete or missing
evidence, notice to the state through requests from the defendant that the evidence should be preserved, and the degree of recklessness or extreme negligence by the government, all may be considerations that can prove helpful to
defendants bringing a Youngblood claim.
Common threads tying the successful cases together include an emphasis on the materiality of the destroyed evidence and a focus on the state's lack of
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explanation for the destroyed material, indicating that both factors may compel
a court to make a finding of bad faith.
Perhaps the most important message from the successful cases, though,
is one of possibility. They stand for the proposition that successfully arguing a
Youngblood claim is an attainable, if difficult, goal.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

37

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 109, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 8

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol109/iss2/8

38

